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“The loneliest spot on Earth”:
Harry Mulisch’s Literary Experiment  








Abstract. Harry Mulisch’s Criminal Case 40/61 is often regarded as an early representative 
of the movement of New Journalism and as an example for what we nowadays call 
‘literary non-fiction.’ In this essay, I will argue that this classification does not do justice 
to the complexity of the literary experiments that Mulisch is trying out in this text. In 
Criminal Case 40/61 Mulisch develops a highly personal and literary way to write about 
Adolf Eichmann. A problem as complex as the essence of evil, he claims, can not be 
comprehended with the methods of journalism and history only, the Eichmann enigma 
calls for a new language. I will outline a number of techniques Mulisch used to achieve this 
goal. In this text, Mulisch uses an autofictional construction as well as a metaphorical way 
of thinking and writing that transgresses the journalistic or historicist mimetic-referential 
and discursive ways of writing. Central to Mulisch’s literary method are two principles: 
that of the invention of language and images and that of radical identification. 
Keywords: literary non-fiction; New Journalism; fictionality; autofiction; Harry Mulisch; 
Adolf Eichmann
1. Introduction 
The works of the recently deceased Dutch writer Harry Mulisch are fascinating 
for several reasons. Time and again Mulisch leaves the literary domain to involve 
himself in public affairs. In Het seksuele bolwerk [The sexual stronghold], for 
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instance, he writes extensively on psychoanalysis and in De compositie van de wereld 
[The composition of the world], he presents himself as a philosopher. Readers 
have often been confused by these texts. Philosophers tend not to take Mulisch’s 
main philosophical work very seriously, leaving its discussion to literary critics. 
These in turn have trouble with the book as well, because in it, Mulisch is barely 
manifesting himself in a way that can be called ‘literary.’ The same inconvenience 
applies to the category of texts designated as the ‘documentaries.’ I use this term 
to refer to the more or less essayistic or journalistic texts that Mulisch wrote 
between 1961 and 1973. Shortly after his passing, these texts were reprinted in 
the perhaps rather too monumental collection Opspraak [Scandal] (2011). When 
we focus on these more hybrid texts, we are seeing a much more radical and 
critical thinker than the Mulisch we have come to know from his appearances in 
the mass media over the last few years. 
In many of the obituaries that appeared in November of 2010 the ‘documentary’ 
De zaak 40/61 (1962) [Criminal case 40/61 (2005)] was mentioned as one of Mulisch’s 
important texts. It is the only documentary that has acquired a canonical status 
next to Mulisch’s popular novels such as Twee vrouwen [Two women] and De 
aanslag [The assault] and acknowledged masterpieces such as De ontdekking 
van de hemel [The discovery of heaven] (1992) and Siegfried (2001). The book is 
challenging for a number of reasons. First of all, there is the importance of the 
subject matter itself. In Criminal case 40/61 Mulisch reports on the Eichmann trial 
that took place in Jerusalem in 1961. Witnessing this trial as an observer, Mulisch 
reflects extensively on his own position with regard to the Holocaust and on 
the effects of this horrible event on the world he lives in. Mulisch investigates 
to what extent the experiences of the Second World War (and specifically the 
experiences of Auschwitz) are connected to the political situation of his own 
time. This was one of the first times the young writer (34 years old at the time of 
the trial) appeared to be concerned with world politics and one of the first times 
we find him theorizing about historical experience. Crimial Case 40/61 marks the 
start of Mulisch’s career as a public intellectual (Heynders 2009; Melzer 2003). It 
is important to emphasize that the chapters of the book were articles that Mulisch 
first published in the Dutch weekly Elsevier’s weekblad. To readers of his hitherto 
hermetic and experimental prose works, the appearance of Mulisch’s newspaper 
articles must have come as a surprise. 
It appeared as if literary writer Harry Mulisch had suddenly turned into 
a journalist. It is for this reason that literary historians regard Mulisch as 
an early representative of the movement of New Journalism, which was to 
flourish in the United States shortly thereafter (Johnson 1971; Van den Broek 
2003). Furthermore, Criminal Case 40/61 was to become an important source of 
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inspiration to many writers of what we now tend to call ‘literary nonfiction.’ In 
this essay, I will argue that this classification does not do justice to the complexity 
of the literary experiments that Mulisch is trying out in this text. It will become 
clear that central to this experiment are the use of fictionality and the importance 
of the subjectivity of the writer. Both techniques seem to be opposed to the key 
components of ‘literary nonfiction.’ This analysis of Criminal Case 40/61 will 
make clear how Mulisch dealt with the question of how to write literature about 
Auschwitz. 
2. “A totally different story”: Mulisch between literature and journalism
In the sixties and seventies Mulisch started to incorporate journalistic techniques in 
his literary publications. In the final chapter of his study Onveranderlijk veranderlijk 
[Immutable variable], Jos Buurlage compares Mulisch’s documentaries with 
certain characteristics of New Journalism (Buurlage 1999). He compares Norman 
Mailer’s The Armies of the Night (1968) to Mulisch’s Bericht aan de rattenkoning 
[Message to the rat king] (1966). He concludes that Mulisch makes more intense 
use of literary techniques: Buurlage eventually does not formulate an answer to 
the question whether Mulisch’s texts belong to New Journalism. 1
In the remainder of this essay, I want to show that it is hardly possible to 
answer this question unequivocally. This case shows that even though the writer 
enters the public space to play the role of a journalist, he still does something 
totally different there. In Criminal Case 40/61, Mulisch may wear the mask of the 
journalist, but he remains the writer who uses journalistic techniques alongside 
the techniques of the historian, the philosopher and the literary writer. It is striking 
that Mulisch scarcely has any opinions on journalism. One of the few times he 
says something about it is in an interview he gave in 1978. He is hesitant to give 
his opinion, perhaps because the two friends who are interviewed together with 
him are themselves journalists: Jan Blokker and Henk Hofland. Mulisch says: 
“I never wanted a job, and certainly not in journalism. Because I was very well 
aware that the language of a journalist... But that’s a totally different story” (Van 
Tijn 2007). 2
“A totally different story.” It’s not clear what exactly Mulisch means here. In Criminal 
Case 40/61, we come across another quotation. At the end of the book he reflects on the 
importance that the trial has for himself. He says the following about it:
1 Van Manen (2010) presents a detailed comparison of De zaak 40/61 and Armies of the Night. 
2 “Ik wilde nooit een baan, en zeker niet in de journalistiek. Want ik was me er wel heel goed van 
bewust dat het taalgebruik van een journalist... Maar dat is een totaal ander verhaal” [Trans. Hans 
Verhulst and Sander Bax] (Van Tijn 2007).
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What is more: I am not a lawyer or a journalist; I am a writer, the only one 
to have occupied himself to this extent with Eichmann. I was not invited 
to write this report, I offered my services myself. The Eichmann case 
is more about me than I know myself, and this connection goes farther 
than a thematic link with other work that I have written or will write: 
together with my work, it points to something I am looking for.  (Mulisch 
2005: 159) 3
Mulisch presents himself here quite explicitly as a writer. In this context, he 
emphasizes that he is not working in commission, as a journalist would do, but 
that he himself chose to write about Eichmann. A second difference between the 
writer and the journalist refers to the relationship between the author and that 
which he writes about. A journalist, whether he uses narrative techniques or not, 
must stick to conventionally defined rules: reliability of facts, objectivity, truth. 
The literary writer is not obliged to obey these rules. Furthermore, his relationship 
to the object of research is of a different nature. Mulisch speaks of “something he 
seeks,” “something he is looking for.” The most important differences between 
the journalist and Mulisch precisely hinge on the fact that the writer has more 
freedom in writing on the subject. He can also use a greater variety of literary 
techniques, including fictionality. According to Mulisch, this makes it possible 
to gain a deeper insight into the phenomenon than could be attained through 
journalism. 
So Mulisch stresses that as a writer he writes about the world differently 
than a journalist would do. With this ‘differently’ we rub against the concept 
of the autonomy of literature (Bax 2007). Literary non-fiction may employ 
narrative techniques and literary style, but it does not use that other important 
literary element of fiction (Bax 2007: 225-230). Authors of literary non-fiction 
repeatedly emphasize that in their books nothing is made up, that they write 
non-fiction (Ceelen en Van Bergeijk 2007). Mourits claims that we stumble across 
a fundamental difference here (Mourits 2008). Whereas the novelist has an 
enormous amount of freedom in inventing whatever world he wants to invent, 
the literary nonfiction writer has to stick to reality. Zuiderent points to the same 
problem in an essay on Westerman’s book Ararat (2007) (Zuiderent 2008). The 
core of the matter is that a writer who does not make up anything in his book, 
brings about a totally different literary effect. 
3 “Bovendien ben ik noch jurist noch journalist, ik ben een schrijver, de enige die zich in deze mate 
met Eichmann heeft beziggehouden. Ik ben niet uitgenodigd voor deze reportage, ik heb mijzelf aan-
geboden, de zaak Eichmann heeft meer met mij te maken dan ik zelf weet; en deze relatie gaat verder 
dan een thematisch verband met ander werk, dat ik heb geschreven of nog zal schrijven: mét mijn 
werk wijst zij naar iets, dat ik zoek” (Mulisch 1962: 181). 
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Literary non-fiction is not about creating a world, but about representing a 
world and reflecting on that world. Tom Wolfe claims that New Journalism came 
into existence at a moment when traditional literature was unable to represent 
the complex reality of the changing society in the sixties (Wolfe 1973). Wolfe 
emphasizes the importance of documentation and he invokes the names of writers 
from the realist (pre-modernist) tradition (Balzac, Dickens, Gogol, Tolstoy) to 
show that every great novel has an element of representation, documentation 
and journalism in it (Wolfe 1973: 26-27). It is remarkable that Tom Wolfe should 
proclaim an innovative literary movement in 1973, but use the more or less old-
fashioned nineteenth century realist tradition as a source of inspiration (Bax 2007: 
360-379). “My argument is that the genius of any writer – again, in fiction or in 
nonfiction – will be severely handicapped if he cannot master, or if he abandons, 
the techniques of realism. The psychological, moral, philosophical, emotional, 
poetic, visionary […] power of Dickens, Dostoyevsky, Joyce, Mann, Faulkner, 
is made possible only by the fact that they first wired their work into the main 
circuit, which is realism” (Wolfe 1973: 49). Although Wolfe mentions Dostoevsky 
and Mann, two authors that thoroughly influenced Mulisch’s authorship, the 
label realism does not seem to apply to Mulisch’s literary work at all, nor to his 
conception of literature. In the “Manifests” Mulisch publishes in his Voer voor 
Psychologen [Food for Psychologists] (1960), Mulisch opposes the idea that the 
writer simply reproduces his life experiences on paper. The writer has his most 
intense experiences while writing: writing literature is an existential activity that 
will eventually change the writer. The writer does not merely create a fictional 
world with characters, he creates a world that changes himself. That is why 
Mulisch says in the first manifesto that writing is something “that happens: 
on the paper, in the writing. It is reality” (Mulisch 1960: 75). Literature is not a 
representation of reality, but a reality in itself. Mulisch thus opposes the idea that a 
novel simply depicts reality. The sixteenth manifesto is consistent with this view. 
There Mulisch speaks of  “the mystical image of the white paper” (Mulisch 1960: 
79). There he states that “it is the paper that does the writing” (Mulisch 1960: 79). 
If we use M.H. Abrams’ terminology, Mulisch’s conception of literature should 
be labeled as autonomist or objectivist rather than mimetic (Abrams 1953). The 
author creates a new world in which the experiences of reality are absorbed and 
transformed. In their recent work on Willem Frederik Hermans, Frans Ruiter and 
Wilbert Smulders regard the autonomist view of literature as being based on the 
assumption that modern literature wants to express ‘a truth’ without mirroring 
reality (Ruiter en Smulders 2010). They emphasize the importance of this thesis, 
which underlies the much-cited study by Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp. In the 
course of the nineteenth century, literature loses its mirror function and becomes 
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a ‘lamp.’ Literature loses its faith in its ability to represent reality as closely as 
possible. It realizes that it is itself the subject that creates a reality. At that point in 
time, the problem of the detour comes to light: literature responds to society only 
indirectly, as an autonomous object.
Ruiter and Smulders find that the essence of literary form is “its game 
element” or “the ‘as if’-character of literature” (Ruiter en Smulders 2010: 17). In 
fiction, it is possible to create without rules. Therefore, in modern times literature 
(gradually) becomes “the social domain [...] in which a game can be played with 
reality using the imagination, a game that leaves out of the equation all kinds of 
values from other social areas” (Ruiter en Smulders 2010: 17). In the mirror of 
imagination man can live the freedom that in social life encounters moral and 
legal boundaries. 
From the perspective of the autonomy of literature, literature has a separate 
status because it is the domain of freedom: writers have the freedom to create a 
world (for themselves). Writers of literary non-fiction do not have this freedom: 
the world they describe ought to be a true reflection of events that occurred in 
the extra-literary reality. These writers can perhaps borrow techniques from the 
literary writer, but they can never make use of the same freedom of creation. 
The possibility of using narrative and stylistic techniques may be liberating for a 
journalist, but for a writer who is going to do journalistic work, it must initially 
feel like a limitation. 
This is what Harry Mulisch must have experienced when in 1961 he traveled to 
Jerusalem in order to report on the Eichmann trial. He laid down the experiences 
he gained during this trial in a complex, hybrid text that contains elements of 
journalism, essays, philosophy and literature at the same time. This text started 
off a period in his work in which he repeatedly emphasized that the literary 
writer had to be concerned with current events. Criminal Case 40/61 thus marks 
a decisive turning point in Mulisch’s career as a writer. On the one hand, he 
felt as a writer he had to give up some of the freedoms that of the autonomy 
of literature, on the other, however, he (in Criminal Case 40/61) is constantly 
oscillating between reporting facts and interpretations and doing something 
totally different: writing literature.
3. “A stranger in Babylon”: Journalism in Criminal Case 40/61
The book Criminal Case 40/61 contains twelve articles that were published in 
Elsevier’s Magazine between March and September 1961, along with two longer 
pieces in which Mulisch keeps a diary of his stay in Jerusalem. The diary 
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passages in particular contain a lot of fragments we would easily consider to be 
journalistic. Mulisch reflects on this change in his writing style. On one of the first 
nights of the trial he has to report to the Netherlands by telegraph, but he cannot 
deal with the experienced journalists. “At home at summits and in revolutions, 
most appeared to be at ease in the shouting and pushing, but for a simple writer 
this was awful. Used to taking his manuscripts comfortably through the sun to 
his publisher, who welcomes him with a glass of sherry, he now had to push 
Poles and Brazilians aside and hit his fist on the table to get Israeli operators 
to work” (Mulisch 2005: 36). This ‘sherry-drinking’ writer initially does not feel 
at ease in the journalistic chaos, but nevertheless he joins the game voluntarily 
and enthusiastically. It is especially in the diary passages that Mulisch narrates 
his development as a ‘reporter.’ He described his first few days in the building 
where the trial is held.
Then I can see the madhouse in full operation. Reporters and military 
personnel are running in and out the building, girls are carrying cases with 
orange juice, workers are hoisting incomprehensible machines up into 
the windows. Inside, too, they are still putting in the finishing touches. 
A post office has already been furnished. In the press room, which looks 
like a classroom for four hundred students, TV sets are being installed, on 
which the trial will be shown uninterruptedly. I am walking around like a 
stranger in Babylon.  (Mulisch 2005: 33) 4
At the beginning of the text, the writer presents himself as a ‘foreigner’ who 
does not quite fit into the scene where he finds himself. Yet, in the passages 
that follow, he presents a comprehensive report of the trial. He behaves like 
other journalists. He speaks with colleagues about the progress of the trial and 
he occasionally manages to speak to main actors (such as Eichmann’s assistant 
solicitor and prosecutor Hausner). In June, he seems to feel completely fine: “I am 
quickly becoming a real reporter: I can now even offer a world premiere. As one 
will see in a moment, it may even be called a cosmic premiere. I have succeeded 
in obtaining a half-hour access to Eichmann’s autobiography, which he wrote 
during his time in prison” (Mulisch 2005: 133). 
Unlike the average journalist, Mulisch reserves a lot of room in his diaries 
for controversial observations, such as political and philosophical interpretations 
and for autobiographical accounts of his experiences alongside the trial. These 
4 “Dan is het gekkenhuis in volle werking zichtbaar. Journalisten en militairen hollen het gebouw 
in en uit, meisjes sjouwen met kisten sinaasappelsap, arbeiders hijsen onbegrijpelijke machines de 
ramen in. Ook binnen wordt overal nog getimmerd. Post-, telegraaf- en telefoonkantoor zijn al in-
gericht; in de perszaal, die er uitziet als een schoolklas voor vierhonderd leerlingen, worden televi-
sietoestellen geïnstalleerd, waarop het proces onafgebroken zichtbaar zal zijn. Ik loop rond als een 
vreemdeling in Babylon” (Mulisch 1962: 37).
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diary passages create the picture of a writer teetering between his old identity as 
a writer and his ‘new’ identity as a reporter. This development doesn’t take place 
overnight. Mulisch shows this by doing what we expect from a writer: he reports 
on his wonder from a distance.
In 1961, Mulisch describes his development as a journalist somewhat 
hesitantly; four years later, he presents it as the most natural thing in the world. 
When he learned that Eichmann was arrested, he immediately knew that he 
wanted to report on the trial. “That’s it! That same day I stood on the steps of Het 
Parool. But the editor-in-chief didn’t want to receive me until the following week. 
Ten minutes later I was in the office of the editor-in-chief of De Volkskrant. He had 
just contracted someone else to cover the process in Israel, but he took the phone 
and called Elseviers Weekblad, where half an hour later the case was settled within 
five minutes” (Mulisch 1966: 26). 
Mulisch writes this at the beginning of Message to the Rat King. It presents a 
totally different writer than the one we have come to know from the passages 
from Criminal Case 40/61 quoted earlier. The first-person narrator from this 
later ‘documentary’ is an observing, detached writer who is trying to become 
a reporter, sometimes reluctantly, while the first-person narrator in Message to 
the Rat King wants to emphasize how quickly he reacted to the latest news and 
how easily he moved in circles of newspaper editors. Although both first-person 
narrators may be regarded as representations of the committed writer Harry 
Mulisch, there is quite a bit of difference between the two.
It is important to reflect on who is speaking in these documentary texts. 
Because it is a journalistic essay or text, we tend to easily equate the first-person 
narrator with the author Harry Mulisch. But as we have seen above, we should 
keep the subtle differences between the texts in mind. Buurlage (1999) has shown 
that the author of the ‘documentaries’ uses several narrative techniques that 
the novelist has at his disposal. In these texts, Buurlage distinguishes several 
constructed narrators and characters: “Mulisch has created a picaresque Mulisch, 
of whom no assessment can be made with certainty how close it is to the author. 
The picaro contributes to the destabilization: how seriously should the reader 
take his remarks?” (Buurlage 1999: 120). 
Buurlage is right in emphasizing the constructed nature of the narrative voice 
in these ‘documentaries,’ he also rightly notes that Mulisch makes extensive use 
of literary techniques in these texts. Mulisch’s compositions are ‘labyrinthic,’ 
they give the readers a lot more freedom to find their way into the book. Another 
main difference is that he interprets the actual events in a broader philosophical 
or cultural-historical context. According to Buurlage, these texts are written 
to create so much confusion in the reader that he starts reflecting on his own 
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conventional and fixed worldview. In observing this, however, Buurlage fails 
to do justice to the fact that in these texts a narrator is speaking who wants to 
make real and relevant statements (observations) about the current events he is 
describing. I regard Mulisch’s use of narrative techniques as an essential part of 
what the author wants to get across to us. In this case, I would prefer to speak of 
a first-person narrator called Harry Mulisch, which we can regard as a fictional 
construction by the author Mulisch (Heynders 2010). These autofictional passages 
can be read as reflections of the author on his own authorship, particularly on his 
new role as a public writer. 
4. “I can only speak in images”: Writing about Eichmann
Rather than calling Mulisch a picaresque writer, I would like to speak of 
‘chameleonesque authorship.’ In the various chapters of Criminal Case 40/61, 
Mulisch continuously uses different registers. The text can be considered as an 
amalgam of various genres, in which news reports, history, essays, philosophy 
and poetic theory are intertwined. 5 I will illustrate this with a brief analysis of 
the opening pages of the book. Mulisch starts with the “The Verdict and the 
Execution,” a chapter in which he places the Eichmann trial in the wider context 
of “a lonely man, face to face with his destruction” (Mulisch 2005: 9). He starts off 
by describing the trial as a meeting: “we people [...] meet [...] the most merciless 
image of the existence of reality” (Mulisch 2005: 9). In this introduction, Mulisch 
combines a number of motifs such as destruction, reality and death that we also 
find in previous books like Het stenen bruidsbed (1959) [The Stone Bridal Bed (1962)] 
and Tanchelijn (1960). This makes clear that Eichmann represents something this 
writer recognizes as a problem that he wants to approach in a literary way. 
Who is it that is speaking to us in the first few pages of this ‘documentary’? It 
is certainly not a journalist. For that to be the case, this text is colored too much by 
subjective interpretation. The voice of this first-person narrator resembles that of 
the first-person narrator of Voer voor psychologen. In these first few pages, we meet 
a writer who uses all kinds of literary techniques to paint a picture of Eichmann. 
Quite illustrative of the freedom he allows himself is the often criticized second 
chapter, in which Mulisch makes use of a rather kitschy trope: he cuts a photo 
of Eichmann’s head in half, thus creating ‘two Eichmanns’ (emerging when each 
half is combined with its mirror-image). These two characters are subsequently 
contrasted as ‘the killer’ and ‘his conscience.’ 
5 For a convincing defense of this position, see Van Manen (2010). 
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That is why I believe we will be getting closer to the truth if we see the 
witness in figure 3. Figure 3 is the face that sees what the man in figure 
2 does. Figure 2 is the slick, unmoved, merciless face of the killer; figure 
3 is the face that observes the killing, filled with horror. Or: if figure 2 is 
Eichmann, then figure 3 is the face of the world watching him at work. 
Returning to Eichmann’s real face: the right-hand side is the part on which 
his crimes have had an effect, the side of the heart; the left-hand side is the 
part that committed the crimes.  (Mulisch 2005: 14) 6  
Undoubtedly, the author is aware of the scientific inaccuracy of this ‘psychological’ 
analysis of Eichmann. He uses this little mind game as a literary image that shows 
the reader what is central to his interpretation of this man: Eichmann once was an 
ordinary man, but in the course of the war he became totally dehumanized. And 
it is this change that is the mystery that Mulisch wants to resolve. In the brutal 
killer, the man he once was is in some way still present. In this sense, rather 
similar to Norman Corinth, the main character in The Stone Bridal Bed, Mulisch 
regards Eichmann as a man who carries his war trauma as a wound in his face. 
Here, at the beginning of his account of the Eichmann Trial, Mulisch approaches 
the defendant in exactly the same way he approaches the characters in his novels. 
In the third chapter, we hear a different voice: Mulisch presents himself as 
an apparently objective historian or biographer. However, at the same time he 
points out the inadequacy of the method he is employing here. The third chapter 
is called “Biography of a German.” Mulisch uses historicizing descriptions 
alongside passages in which he interprets Eichmann’s deeds. At one point, he 
asks why Eichmann was devoted to Judaism in his youth. He proposes a few 
complex answers to this question, but hastens to add: “I know I am being vague 
and mysterious – but speaking more clearly here would be more deceitful” 
(Mulisch 2005: 18). Later he wonders whether the mass murders resulted from 
Eichmann’s desire: 
Will we get one step, one tiny step, closer to the truth by saying that he 
wanted something like this? Not exactly this, but something like this: a blood 
wedding with Jewry, which in any case meant his own extermination, a 
piece of disgusting excrement – I beg your pardon, but I can only speak 
in images. What made Eichmann tick was at most an image, not an idea. 
6 “Daarom geloof ik dat wij dichter bij de waarheid komen, wanneer wij in afbeelding 3 de getuige 
zien. Afbeelding 3 is het gezicht dat ziet, wat de man van afbeelding 2 doet. Afbeelding 2 is het glad-
de, onbewogen meedogenloze gezicht van de moordenaar, afbeelding 3 is het gezicht dat er vertrok-
ken van afschuw naar kijkt. Of anders gezegd: als afbeelding 2 Eichmann zou zijn, dan is afbeelding 
3 het gezicht van de wereld, die hem aan het werk ziet. Om terug te keren tot Eichmanns werkelijke 
gezicht: de rechterhelft [afbeelding 3 – S.B.] is het deel, waar zijn daden uitwerking op hem hebben 
gehad, de kant van het hart, de linkerhelft is het deel, dat ze bedreven heeft” (Mulisch 1962: 17).
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Even at that, an image that will remain in the darkness forever because it 
is darkness.”  (Mulisch 2005: 19) 7
If I were to paraphrase these two passages, it might run something like (they 
would come down to something like): we can speak clearly on matters that are 
clear (such as the known facts of Eichmann’s biography), but we need another, 
more complex language to speak of the things that puzzle us (the motives and 
mental development of Eichmann). The journalist or historian, who gives a clear 
answer, is deceiving himself if he thinks he has got at the truth of the matter. 
To penetrate more deeply into the problem of Eichmann, another language is 
needed. In this book, Mulisch is looking for that language, looking for a way 
to understand what cannot be understood. The second quotation makes clear 
that the language that is needed will have to be a literary language (a language 
of images), which digs deeper than the language of the historian or journalistic 
description. Mulisch uses a number of key concepts, “not this but something like 
this,” “no idea, but a picture.” From these observations, we can deduce that the 
literary language that Mulisch refers to is not mimetic, but metaphorical, and 
thus indirect and inadequate. He states that it is an image “that will stay in the 
darkness for ever.” The truth about Eichmann cannot simply be described; the 
writer can only show its incomprehensibility.
The first three chapters of Criminal Case 40/61 show why it is essential that 
Mulisch looked into this matter as a writer and not as a journalist or a historian. 
In order to understand Eichmann it is necessary for  the writer to be experimental 
and open. Mulisch’s account of the Eichmann trial – as so many of Mulisch’s texts 
– is a literary experiment. The author identifies completely with that which he is 
writing about and is constantly looking for a writing style that does justice to the 
complexity of it. While journalist and historians write down their commentary 
after things have happened, literary writers have the freedom to let the text 
happen while they are writing. This not only holds for Mulisch’s novels, it also 
holds for his seemingly journalistic texts. In the course of writing the experimental 
Criminal Case 40/61, Mulisch finds out that the only way to understand Eichmann 
is by radical identification. 
7 “Komen wij de waarheid misschien een stapje, een heel klein stapje nader door te zeggen, dat hij 
iets als dit heeft gewild? Niet dit, maar iets als dit: een bloedbruiloft met het jodendom die in elk geval 
zijn eigen vernietiging inhield, een walgelijk exkrement – ik vraag exkuus, ik kan alleen in beelden 
spreken: ook wat Eichmann dreef, was hoogstens een beeld, geen gedachte. En dan nog een beeld, dat 
voorgoed in het duister zal blijven, omdat het duisternis is” (Mulisch 1962: 21).
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5. “A revelation in a world of machines”: Mulisch’s analysis of 
Eichmann
In the chapters “The Horror and Its Depiction” and “The Horror and Its Origin,” 
“The Order as Fate” and “The Ideal of Psycho-Technology” Mulisch elaborates 
on this method of radical identification. The four chapters can be read as an 
analysis of Eichmann in four steps. Central to these chapters is the connection 
between the artist and the mass murderer (Hitler, Eichmann). In “The Horror 
and Its Depiction,” Mulisch posits the thesis that the horror has already been 
represented by artists before it actually occurred. Mulisch describes a literary 
tradition that had already sketched the images of the evil to come. This tradition 
starts with De Sade, or Goethe’s Faust, then moves through German Romanticism 
(especially E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann), Lautreamont, Nietzsche (the first 
victim of the Nazis), Baudelaire, Heinrich Mann and André Breton. The first thing 
Mulisch does is to declare his solidarity with these writers: “I am their colleague. 
Writing something and doing something makes exactly all the difference in the 
world. [...] It is important to know how the portrayers of an artistically destroyed 
world relate to a world destroyer” (Mulisch 2005: 91). 
Mulisch firmly speaks of it making “all the difference in the world.” But we can 
ask ourselves how sure he really is about that. By bringing the artist so directly 
in touch with the ultimate destroyer, he is taking the risk of coinciding with 
this destroyer. How does an artistically destroyed world relate to the factually 
destroyed world? To justify this difference, Mulisch brings the autonomy of 
literature to mind, which I discussed earlier. Writing something is completely 
different from doing something. Writing is indirect, reflective and therefore 
a beacon against the violence in reality; doing on the other hand, is direct, 
aggressive and dangerous. Thanks to his talent, the literary writer can permit 
himself to represent evil. When a man has no artistic talent, like Hitler, this will 
lead to catastrophe. “So it boils down to this: Hitler’s world was depicted before 
its arrival by ‘opponents.’ Since they had depicted it, they were in a position to be 
opponents. Their talent saved them. Less gifted brothers such as Hitler himself 
could only rid themselves of their nostalgia through actual destruction” (Mulisch 
2005: 92). 
Mulisch wants to find out what the artists were actually portraying. They 
were writing to resist something they feared. In the German film Das Cabinet 
des Doktor Caligari (1920), based on the aforementioned Der Sandmann, scientist 
Dr. Caligari hypnotizes the medium Cesare to make him carry out a great many 
murders. In the fictitious person of Dr. Caligari, Mulisch sees a picture of Hitler, 
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in Cesare he sees the portrait of Himmler, but Eichmann is missing. 8 Himmler 
was a hypnotized believer of the Nazi Ideology. Eichmann, on the other hand: 
He was not particularly interested in Hitler. He just obeyed. The medium 
must believe in the hypnotizer, but Eichmann was a medium without belief 
or hypnosis. Himmler believed in Hitler, but Eichmann believed in ‘the 
order.’ Himmler would not have believed in anyone else, but Eichmann 
would have obeyed any other person easily as well. When no more orders 
came, he immediately changed into a ‘peaceable citizen,’ as Servatius so 
rightly remarked.
He represents the difference between the artist and the murderer. And 
if I said earlier objects of art foreshadow future events, then I will say now 
that Eichmann did not foreshadow anything, because he is not what the 
artists wrote about, but why they wrote: the new element they felt was 
approaching and about which they worried, and that enabled the celluloid 
Caligari finally to become a true Hitler – a symbol of ‘progress.’  (Mulisch 
2005: 93) 9
This quotation summarizes the first step in Mulisch’s interpretation of Eichmann. 
First, he states that we should not see Eichmann as the faithful disciple of Hitler. 
He was not brainwashed by Hitler, but rather was someone who would have 
followed any leader blindly. This is evident from the fact that he stopped 
committing crimes as soon as the order ceased to exist. Mulisch concludes from 
this that he was not captivated by the doctrine of National Socialism. People like 
Himmler get carried away by a political ideology: they have such a strong belief 
in their leader that they lose their common sense. This is dangerous, but it can be 
fought against. People like Eichmann, on the other hand, are not carried away by 
adoration but slavishly follow the leader, without taking responsibility for their 
own actions. This is what Mulisch sees as the new element that romantic artists 
felt was approaching. 
A well-trained literary historian will have no difficulty showing the 
inadequacies in Mulisch’s literary-historical account. But that does not diminish 
the power of the image he uses. Neither does it detract from what Mulisch wants 
8 See also Kracauer (1947).
9 “Hij interesseerde zich niet erg voor Hitler. Hij gehoorzaamde alleen. Het medium moet geloof 
hebben in de hypnotiseur, maar Eichmann was een medium zonder geloof of hypnose. Himmler 
geloofde in Hitler, maar Eichmann alleen aan het bevel. Himmler zou in niemand anders geloofd 
hebben, maar Eichmann zou ook ieder ander hebben gehoorzaamd. Toen er geen bevelen meer kwa-
men, veranderde hij op slag in een ‘vreedzaam burger,’ zoals Servatius zeer juist heeft opgemerkt. 
   Hij is het verschil tussen de kunstenaar en de moordenaar. En als ik gezegd heb, dat kunstwerken 
de schaduwen zijn die komende gebeurtenissen vooruitwerpen, dan zeg ik nu, dat Eichmann geen 
schaduw geworpen heeft, omdat hij niet is waarover de kunstenaars schreven, maar waarom zij 
schreven: het nieuwe element, dat zij verontrust voelden naderen, en dat de papieren Caligari als 
een werkelijke Hitler pas mogelijk maakte – het symbool van de ‘vooruitgang’” (Mulisch 1962: 105).
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to communicate through this image: that he himself, here, at this place in the 
text, formulates a crucial insight. Relating Hitler and Eichmann to Hoffmann’s 
literary work, helps him understand how people can be turned into machines. It 
is the metaphor he uses that makes him arrive at this conclusion. He compares 
the triad of Hitler, Himmler and Eichmann to Caligari and Cesare, but finds the 
third character missing (which he will encounter later on in the text). 
It is important to notice that Mulisch uses a literary text as a metaphor here. 
By reading the text as a representation of the future reality, Mulisch becomes 
aware of a possible order of that reality. It goes without saying that this method 
of interpretation would not fit the objectivist journalist or the scientific historian. 
It is one of the techniques that only a literary writer can allow himself to use. 
Writing Criminal Case 40/61, Mulisch discovers the phenomenon of the human 
machine, which will be central to the literary oeuvre he would produce in the 
years to come. The detour of E.T.A. Hoffmann mainly serves to illustrate how 
literary narratives construct meaning from complex situations in reality. This 
meaning cannot be logical or analytical, but it can be regarded as metaphorical or 
post-logical (Mulisch 1980). 
Before Mulisch continues his analysis of Eichmann, he takes an intermediate 
step in the chapter “The Horror and Its Origins.” Hitler founded his delusions on 
elements of German culture (in particular on Nietzsche and Wagner). This again 
brings to mind the relationship between the artist and the politician. Mulisch 
concludes that Hitler did not steal the ideas of Nietzsche, but only appropriated 
the image of the Übermensch. Hitler’s passion was not the result of years of study, 
but rather derived from “a mystical revelation. He did not read or think. He knew” 
(Mulisch 2005: 111). In the remainder of the chapter, Mulisch reads Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf from the perspective of the mythical schemas Joseph Campbell explained 
in his study The Hero with a Thousand Faces (1949). Mulisch shows how Hitler 
described his own life as that of the traditional mythical hero. In Hitler the idea 
awakens that he is a mythical hero with a divine mission. 
In “The Order as Fate” Mulisch resumes his analysis of Eichmann. He 
distinguishes three categories of mass murderers. The first category consist 
of people like Hitler himself: the leader with a ‘divine’ mission. The second 
category consists of hypnotized believers, such as Himmler. Eichmann belongs 
to a third, even more frightening, category. Eichmann did not believe in the Nazi 
mythology and was in fact fascinated by Judaism. Eichmann’s actions, therefore, 
did not spring from faith but from a belief in ‘The Order.’ “Eichmann followed 
the priest’s orders, which he knew to be false. He would never have given such 
orders himself, he says (no doubt truthfully), but since he was in a position of 
receiving them, he had to obey them” (Mulisch 2005: 111). 
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From this point of view, the ‘order’ is something of a higher power, it is 
something abstract which Mulisch calls fate. In 1944, Eichmann continued with 
the deportation of Jews, even though Himmler had ordered him to stop. He did 
this, Mulisch argues, because Himmler’s command betrayed Hitler’s original 
order: “it’s there. It’s always there. If not Adolf Hitler but Albert Schweitzer had 
been the Reich’s chancellor in those years, and if Eichmann had received an order 
to transport all sick blacks to modern hospitals, then he would have carried out 
that order without fail – with the same pleasure in his own promptness as with 
the work he was now leaving behind. He is less a criminal than he is someone 
who is capable of anything” (Mulisch 2005: 111-112). 
The order is fate; it is eternal. Until Hitler’s death, Eichmann was true to his 
highest command. After Hitler’s death, he pulled out to once again become a 
peaceful citizen, obeying the social commands of the democratic world. Mulisch 
traces the existence of fate back to the Bible, by referring to Exodus 3:14 where 
God says “I am who I am.” Fate is justified because it is there (by the mere fact 
that it is there). At the same time, it should be seen as detached from the religious 
sphere existing between God and believer, as between Hitler and Himmler, 
characterized by a certain warmth. Between a man and a word there is no warmth. 
Behind this mystical identification with the Order is where technology hides. 
Technology is the last step in Mulisch’s analysis of the Eichmann figure (in 
the chapter “The Ideal of Psycho-Technology”). If Eichmann is like a ‘medium 
without hypnosis,’ he actually is a machine. Mulisch returns to Der Sandmann: 
it turns out he does find a representative of Eichmann in literary history. In 
Hoffmann’s novel, we find the automatic doll Olimpia: she does not believe in the 
ideas of her creator Coppelius, but she obeys him because she has to. Eichmann is 
part of a long tradition of automated people and human-like robots: the iron man 
of Francis Bacon, the artificial man of Albertus Magnus, the homunculus in Faust 
and the Golem from Psalm 139. In their works, Goethe and Nietzsche warned 
against this approaching machine. The danger of technology lies not in the 
emergence of the machines, but in the emergence of new, altered, people. It is the 
danger that technology suddenly turns ordinary people into murderers. Mulisch 
tells us to “keep one eye in the mirror”: “ This extremely useful, absolutely 
uncorrupted, highly dangerous man is the precise opposite of a ‘rebel.’ He is 
precisely the opposite of a man who wants to be bad. He is a machine that is good 
for anything. He is the right man in the right place. He is the ideal of psycho-
technology. Millions like him are roaming the world” (Mulisch 2005: 132; 119). 
From the perspective of the journalist or the historian, there is a lot to be said 
about Mulisch’s analysis. Critics pointed at the fact that his argumentations are 
sometimes self-contradictory. If fate is eternal, then how can Eichmann obey the 
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laws of democracy later on? Huib Drion’s critique in Tirade is illustrative in this 
respect (Drion 1966). Drion starts by strongly criticizing Mulisch’s way of turning 
evil into literature. He observes that to him certain passages look like “still lives 
of millions of murdered Jews” (Drion 1966: 33). He subsequently deals with the 
analysis of Eichmann. With regard to Eichmann continuing the deportations 
when Himmler forbade him to do so, Drion is not convinced by Mulisch’s 
aforementioned argument: why would Eichmann slavishly obey Hitler and not 
slavishly obey Himmler? Is there not some belief involved there too?  
Drion’s interpretation of Eichmann is as that of the artist of the organization, 
to whom it did not matter what he had to organize, as long as he could perform 
perfectly. That is why he could not follow orders that went against the art of 
his own organizational work. This is a clever argument, because Drion places 
Eichmann on the side of the artists while Mulisch portrays him as the opposite of 
the artist. Mulisch posits that there is an essential difference between the action 
and the word, Drion on the other hand suggests that there is no fundamental 
difference between them. An artist ignoring legal and ethical standards is 
relatively harmless. He who applies his organizational skills to human behavior 
becomes as dangerous as Eichmann.  
Renate Rubinstein also opposes the interpretation of Eichmann as a robot 
(Rubinstein 1962). She appreciates the authenticity of the book and the thorough 
documentation. For her, there are two types of text in Criminal Case 40/61. On 
the one hand, there is the modern, sober Mulisch who is writing a documentary; 
on the other hand, there is a “too enigmatic and sometimes manic visionary,” 
who emerges in the more philosophical passages (Rubinstein 1962). Thus she 
sees the story of the two halves of Eichmann’s face as “nonsense for women’s 
magazines.” Rubinstein argues that Mulisch fell for the image that the Eichmann 
defense created: that of the common man who was simply following orders. 
For a ‘romantic rebel’ like Harry Mulisch this would be a logical choice. A real 
criminal he would have admired, the ordinary citizen is what he hates the most. 
In their reviews, Drion and Rubinstein approach Mulisch’s texts as if it were 
a journalistic text. Although their responses are appropriate and relevant when 
it comes to factual mistakes and faulty reasoning, their criticism does not touch 
the heart of Mulisch’s argument. The representation of Eichmann may not be 
scientifically correct, but it is questionable to assume that what Mulisch was 
aiming for was indeed to paint an adequate picture of Eichmann. In a sense, the 
writer Mulisch uses Eichmann as a character that gives rise to a philosophical 
reflection on the historicity and the real and present danger of evil. Rubinstein 
and Drion’s reactions do not take this reflection into account. Thus these two 
reviews illustrate once again that we should not consider Criminal Case 40/61 
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as a journalistic book. Those who want to understand what and how this book 
communicates about Adolf Eichmann, the Holocaust and its implications, must 
take into account the complex techniques Mulisch employs, not to conceal or to 
impose esthetics, but to create a literary and hybrid way of communicating. 
6. “The mystery of reality” 
Looking at Eichmann, Mulisch was witnessing something that disturbed him 
greatly: technology is able to dehumanize people and turn them into machines. For 
the first time, Mulisch seems to realize that the ‘horror’ is not a historical phenomenon 
that is finished (like his war crimes were for character Norman Corinth in The Stone 
Bridal Bed. If the war were a closed chapter, we would be reading a book about a 
specific megalomaniacal figure (presenting himself as godlike and recognized as 
such by his brainwashed followers). With the disappearance of the Leader, the 
whole movement would disappear. But Mulisch realizes that technology changed 
something essential in the essence of human beings. The Holocaust is not a closed 
chapter, but a major shift in European history. 
I mean that thus far the ideologues and believers have determined, 
in a more or less human fight, what kind of society there will be; the 
Eichmanns obeyed whoever was the boss then: Hitler, Churchill, Stalin, 
and Roosevelt. But things may change in the sense (quite a few signs are 
pointing in that direction) that there will be fewer and fewer ideologues 
and believers, until only the Eichmanns are left in a world of machines. 
And so the chances are great for the man with the ‘revelation,’ who will 
always be there, to gain absolutely unimaginable power, both for better 
and for worse.  (Mulisch 2005: 120) 10 
At the end of the book, in the penultimate chapter, Mulisch summarizes what 
he has learned in the course of the process. He has developed a new view of 
modern man. Modern man is like “the smallest man,” thriving thanks to the 
great technology. Today, Mulisch states, we have a bomb that can destroy the 
world in one second. This underscores the danger of “this small man with his 
great technology” in the Cold War period. 
10 “Ik bedoel, dat tot dusver de ideologen en de gelovigen in min of meer menselijke strijd hebben 
bepaald, welke maatschappij er zal zijn; de Eichmanns gehoorzaamden wie juist boven was: Hitler, 
Churchill, Stalin of Roosevelt. Maar de dingen konden wel eens in die zin veranderen (waar niet 
weinig tekenen op wijzen), dat er steeds minder christenen, kommunisten, socialisten en nazi’s zullen 
komen, steeds minder ideologen en gelovigen, tot er alleen nog maar Eichmanns bestaan in een we-
reld van machines, – waardoor de kansen van de man met de ‘openbaring,’ die er steeds zal zijn, tot 
in het volstrekte onvoorstelbare zullen stijgen, zowel ten goede als ten kwade” (Mulisch 1962: 135).
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Man is not a given, but a possibility – for everything. That is of course also 
his greatness, but that is not our topic. Our topic is the other side of his 
greatness. Thus Eichmann will not yet again become something great, not 
an ‘Anti-Christ’ or a ‘Genghis Khan,’ but exactly the opposite of ‘greatness’: 
smallness. Eichmann as the smallest human being – with that portrait we are 
getting closest to the likeness. And he was able to be so small because 
the technology was so great: the railways, the administration, the gas 
chambers, the crematoriums. 
This small man with his great technology is the one we are fighting. 
With the arrival of the H-bomb, man has become even smaller – it looks like 
soon there will be nothing left for him to destroy. Here lies the difficulty 
of our fight against nuclear weapons. We are this technology ourselves, or 
better: it is what we exactly no longer are ourselves; is our shortcoming, and 
it is great at our expense. If we fight it in its murderous manifestations, we 
are fighting ourselves in the first place […], and not C or K, who just happen 
to be sitting at the controls here or there.  (Mulisch 2005: 161-162) 11
Mulisch broadens his interpretation of Eichmann as “the smallest human being” 
to cultural criticism of his own times. We cannot fail to notice that he starts  using 
the first-person plural here. Using “we,” Mulisch points at himself and the rest 
of contemporary modern human beings. He is not speaking as the detached 
literary writer who is contemplating the events, but rather speaks as someone 
who underscores his solidarity with humanity. We have to fight something in the 
years to come: the technology that made possible the atomic bomb. From 1962 
onwards, Mulisch will keep emphasizing this danger. Mulisch’s fear of nuclear 
destruction can be regarded as the driving force behind his later manifestations 
as a committed writer. 12 Visiting the trial, Mulisch was looking for something. 
At the end of the text he seems to have found it: his new identity as a socially 
engaged writer. 
11 “De mens is geen gegevenheid, maar een mogelijkheid – tot alles. Dat is natuurlijk ook zijn groot-
heid, maar die is niet ons onderwerp. Ons onderwerp is de keerzijde van zijn grootheid. Daarmee 
wordt Eichmann niet tóch weer iets groots, niet een ‘Antichrist’ of ‘Djenghiz Khan,’ maar het tegen-
deel nu juist van ‘grootheid’: kleinheid. Eichmann als de kleinste mens – met dat portret komen wij 
het dichtst bij de gelijkenis. En hij kon zo klein zijn omdat de techniek zo groot was: de spoorwegen, 
de administratie, de gaskamers, de krematoria.
   Deze kleinste mens met zijn grote techniek is het, die wij bestrijden. Met de komst van H-bom is de 
mens nog kleiner geworden, – het gaat er op lijken, dat er binnenkort niets meer aan hem te vernieti-
gen zal zijn. Hier schuilt de moeilijkheid van ons gevecht tegen de atoomwapens. Deze techniek zijn 
wij zelf, of beter: zij is wat wij juist niet meer zelf zijn, zij is ons tekort, zij is groot ten koste van ons. 
Als wij haar in haar moorddadige uitingen bestrijden, bestrijden wij in eerste plaats onszelf […] en 
niet C of K, die hier of daar toevallig aan de knop zitten” (Mulisch 1962: 183-184).
12 Two essays/lectures are illustrative in this respect: “Het ‘neen’” [The ‘no’] (Mulisch 1967: 239-248) 
en “Een geldig recept?” [A valid recipe?] (Mulisch 1978: 35-45).
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In the final chapters of the book Mulisch reflects on his own position. He 
begins the chapter “On Feelings of Guilt, Guilt, and Reality” with a digression on 
the relation between literature and law. Although the process was theatrical in 
all respects, it was not a work of art, for the result is very real: “But, of course, it 
is exactly the opposite of a work of art – although it is happening here on a stage. 
For it is not without obligations; it is binding and cannot be changed. It is not the 
expression of one human being, it is a work of reality forming the basis of man” 
(Mulisch 2005: 144). 
The word ‘reality’ refers to the society that condemns Eichmann. It is not 
the individual (judge Landau) who condemns him; the place where he sits is 
one that represents society, that represents “us.” That is the reason why law is 
binding and immutable. The judge is not a sovereign individual, but represents 
an institution that the democratic state founded to make the final judgment. The 
work of art, by contrast, is free and mutable. The difference between the artist and 
the judge resembles that between the murderer (who can ‘sign’ his murder) and 
the executioner, the anonymous ‘institution’ that we employ to kill the convicted. 
Mulisch is fascinated by the fact that this kind of legal reasoning can actually 
change reality (whereas literary thinking will never actually change the world). 
But this is exactly what the new Harry Mulisch wants to do: the committed 
writer Mulisch in this text is coming into being, is emerging, searching for 
a literature that may affect reality. Not only legal reasoning can change the 
world, political reasoning can do so too. The State of Israel began as an idea 
in the mind of Theodore Herzl, but he managed to make his thoughts become 
real. “Everything that happens is something, is irrevocable and influences world 
events – […]” (Mulisch 2005: 145). Mulisch explains Herzl’s success by positing 
that Jewish thinking is legal rather than mythical. The Jews are not so much ‘in 
touch’ with their God as ‘in contract’ with Him. It is this unmythical spirit that 
also created geniuses like Marx, Freud and Einstein, geniuses who approached 
unexplored areas with their minds. “The common denominator in all of these 
Jewish ‘lawmakers’ is that they penetrate with the mind where it was considered 
impossible: in those areas that were exactly part of the ‘mystical’ before their 
actions. This is mathematically opposed to the movement of Hitler’s mind” 
(Mulisch 2005: 146). Jewish legal thinking is the absolute opposite of failed artist 
Hitler’s artistic reasoning. It follows that his politics (by their permissiveness) 
were not able to change reality. Mulisch therefore concludes that his project was 
doomed to fail. Hitler wanted to create a world as an individual, like an artist 
would do, but the artistic world cannot ever exist in reality. 
At this point in the text, Mulisch has minimized the distance between himself 
and Hitler. Like Hitler, Mulisch as an artist is fascinated by creating worlds (think 
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of his autonomist poetics), but like Hitler, Mulisch reflects on the inability of his 
created worlds to actually be sustained. In the course of writing Criminal Case 
40/61, Mulisch positions himself closer and closer to Hitler. He compares himself 
to Hitler and he describes Eichmann as if he were his creation, as a character in 
one of his novels. Mulisch must have concluded that he had been putting himself 
at risk. In the final chapter, he explains why that is the only method to really 
understand evil. 
In “On Common Sense, Christians, and Thomas Mann” Mulisch takes the 
analysis one last step further. The trial is over, Eichmann’s lawyer Servatius 
has left, and Eichmann will be condemned. Mulisch wonders what the 
implications of the trial will be for the time in which he lives. The revelation 
may occur again at any moment, and what should we do to create a bulwark 
against barbarism. Using our common sense will certainly not be enough: 
modern man is simply inclined to be hypnotized. Rejecting or saying no, 
as famous pre-war Dutch critic Menno ter Braak would do, will not suffice 
either. “The thinking of his disciples in general does not extend beyond the 
idea that one must think; and if one researches what his followers think they 
would eventually place opposite totalitarian barbarism, one finds collective 
suicide” (Mulisch 2005: 151).  
Might another revelation be a good answer? For small groups, Christian 
morality might have worked during the war, but Christianity was unable to 
prevent the horror. Mulisch comes to the conclusion that we are defenseless. 
Not even the ‘elite conceptions’ of Menno ter Braak can do anything to prevent 
the hypnotizing of the masses. Ter Braak had used the word ‘schipperen’ (being 
prepared to compromise) to describe the role of the intellectual in the face of mass 
hysteria. Mulisch criticized the concept of compromising: beautiful words that 
mask the fact that Ter Braak was simply opting for opportunism. This strategy 
has proven totally ineffective. Mulisch contrasts Ter Braak with Thomas Mann: 
“He [Mann] understood that one must not coolly and wisely distance oneself 
from the areas from which the danger is imminent, but, more precisely, one 
must get in contact with the domains below the belt, with the darkness, with the 
‘myth’” (Mulisch 2005: 153). 
Mann is the only writer who was able to represent the horror afterwards. In 
the novel Doktor Faustus, Mann was able to represent the essence of Nazism. He 
did so by placing the evil in a tradition running from the Middle Ages through 
Luther and Goethe, to Nietzsche, who is the model for the protagonist of the 
novel. Mulisch makes clear that in Criminal Case 40/61 he is trying to do the same. 
He makes contact with Hitler and Eichmann by trying to identify with them. 
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Yet Mulisch does not deduce (believe) that literature itself can be a bulwark against 
the threat: perhaps we can invent something against hypnosis, but what do we 
do with the machine of man, with Eichmann? In the chapter “A Consideration 
in Warsaw,” Mulisch considers the place of Eichmann in history. Ultimately, 
thinking about history always serves to (better) understand the present: 
Eichmann has finally become history. What am I talking about then? People 
are threatening each other with a destruction that would trivialize the 
Holocaust, turn it into a memory from the good old days. And no American 
or Russian will refuse the order to drop bombs on the weak flesh of entire 
peoples – just as Eichmann did not refuse. What can we hold against 
Eichmann, now that we are even threatening the unborn, and we have 
waged that war against our offspring for sixteen years already. But that is 
no longer called a ‘war,’ but a curse. Here it is, a man cursing himself, his 
own children’s children. This shows hatred so fundamental that we must 
still be afraid of having overestimated man. The Russians say whatever 
they want to, the Americans say whatever they want to, everybody says 
whatever they want to. When the irreversible happens, it is not ‘they’ who 
did it, but always we: we people. When we think about ourselves, we stare 
into a sewer into which Dante would not have ascended, not even led by a 
thousand poets.  (Mulisch 2005: 158) 13
Mulisch reflects on the fact that some critics blamed him for writing too 
sympathetically about Eichmann. To explain this personal involvement, he refers 
to Dennis de Rougemont and Thomas Mann. His engaged tone may possibly be 
painful to people’s ears, but it is the only way to write about Eichmann. I started 
my discussion with a short quotation from a passage from Criminal Case 40/61, 
which I would now like to quote in full: 
It is the tone of those for whom Auschwitz did not come as a surprise, of 
those who were right. It is the right tone. What is more: I am not a lawyer 
or a journalist; I am a writer, the only one to have occupied himself to this 
extent with Eichmann. I was not invited to write this report, I offered my 
13 “Eichmann is definitief geschiedenis geworden. Waar praat ik nog over? Mensen bedreigen mensen 
met een vernietiging, waarnaast de jodenmoord een bagatel zal worden, een herinnering uit de goede 
oude tijd. En geen amerikaan of rus die, komt het bevel, zal weigeren de bommen in het zachte vlees 
van hele volkeren te werpen – zo min als Eichmann weigerde. Wat hebben wij eigenlijk over Eich-
mann te beweren? Wij, die zelfs de ongeborenen bedreigen: en die oorlog tegen ons nageslacht is al 
zestien jaar aan de gang! Maar zoiets heet geen ‘oorlog’ meer, dat heet een vervloeking. Hier vervloekt 
de mens zichzelf, zijn eigen kindskinderen, hieruit spreekt een haat zo fundamenteel, dat wij wel 
moeten vrezen, de mens nog altijd overschat te hebben. De russen kunnen zeggen wat zijn willen, de 
amerikanen kunnen zeggen wat zij willen, iedereen kan zeggen wat hij wil. Als het onherroepelijke 
gebeurt, hebben niet ‘zij’ het gedaan, maar altijd wij: wij mensen. Als wij aan onszelf denken, staren 
wij in een cloaca, waarin Dante nog niets aan de hand van duizend dichters zou zijn afgedaald” 
(Mulisch 1962: 179-80).
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services myself. The Eichmann case is more about me than I know myself, 
and this connection goes farther than a thematic link with other work that 
I have written or will write: together with my work, it points to something 
I am looking for. Of course I can say: Eichmann is my father. But that is 
annoying. I will leave that to others. I could also say: he is me. But that is 
too nice. I can also say: in the trial, the mystery of reality reveals itself. But 
I have already said that. Now I would like to say: he is one of the two or 
three people who have changed me.  (Mulisch 2005: 159) 14  
In this extended version, Mulisch presents some insights on the connection 
between Eichmann and his father and between Eichmann and himself. The 
conclusion is that Eichmann has changed him – we as readers have just witnessed 
that transformation process. Writing Criminal Case 40/61 was an experiment in 
which the author put himself at risk. He tried to identify with Eichmann, but 
gradually learned that he appeared to be closer to Hitler. This may have cured 
him from free indignation, but also from carelessness. He sees him and others in 
a brighter light, he has become vigilant. He sees all lapsing transitions between 
Eichmann and himself, and between the dead and the living. In other words, 
good and evil are no longer clearly defined: “This is where speechlessness 
begins” (Mulisch 2005: 159). 
7. “This is where speechlessness begins”: Literary representation 
of the Holocaust
With the concept of ‘speechlessness,’ we arrive at the parts of the book that 
I have left undiscussed. The text allowed me to do this, but I could only do so by 
focusing on the essay-like passages. At the beginning of my analysis, I was able 
to discuss Mulisch’s reflections on being a reporter by paying attention to the 
passages in the diary sections. I had to disregard two chapters and a great many 
passages from the diary sections. In the latter case, we can think of the numerous 
digressions about Jerusalem and its environment, which create the impression of 
14 “Het is de toon van hen, voor wie Auschwitz niet als een verrassing is gekomen, van hen, die gelijk 
hadden. Het is de goede toon. Bovendien ben ik noch jurist noch journalist, ik ben een schrijver, de 
enige die zich in deze mate met Eichmann heeft beziggehouden. Ik ben niet uitgenodigd voor deze 
reportage, ik heb mijzelf aangeboden, de zaak Eichmann heeft meer met mij te maken dan ik zelf 
weet; en deze relatie gaat verder dan een thematisch verband met ander werk, dat ik heb geschreven 
of nog zal schrijven: mét mijn werk wijst zij naar iets, dat ik zoek. Ik kan natuurlijk zeggen: Eichmann 
is mijn vader. Maar dat is vervelend, dat moeten anderen maar zeggen. Ik zou ook kunnen zeggen: 
ik ben het zelf. Maar dat is te fraai. Ik kan ook zeggen: in het proces openbaart zich het mysterie der 
werkelijkheid. Maar dat heb ik al gezegd. Ik zou nu willen zeggen: hij hoort tot de twee of drie men-
sen, die mij veranderd hebben” (Mulisch 1962: 181).
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being there just for embellishment. The two chapters (“A Ruin in Berlin” and “A 
Museum in Oswiecim”) reveal that there is more going on. In all these cases, the 
descriptions of locations command attention: Jerusalem, Berlin and Auschwitz. 
In these passages, the reporter, the philosopher and the historian are absent. 
Here, we find a narrator who most closely resembles the literary writer. In 
several scenes we meet the writer, who is present at these places where so many 
historical dimensions come together. He tries to make contact with the past from 
the present. The sites he visits carry the echoes of the events that happened there. 
While the reasoning and philosophizing Mulisch encounters speechlessness, 
the literary writer starts to speak. We no longer read a descriptive or cultural 
critical essay, but we are engaged with a literary writer who shows us images 
and who articulates his experiences. The images he shows us aim to represent the 
speechlessness and darkness that are so central to the essayistic parts of the book. 
In “A Ruin in Berlin” (the sixth chapter, placed after the first “Jerusalem Diary”), 
Mulisch visits Berlin to look for traces of Eichmann. What he describes there can 
be considered an image of the speechlessness, the ruin, literally a “no man’s land”: 
“Set somewhat to the back, in no-man’s-land, in the Niederkirchnerstraβe, once 
the Prinz Albrechtstraβe, lie the remainders of the former Gestapo headquarters, 
which used to be a school for industrial art. The entire building collapsed into the 
basement, in which thousands had been tortured to death, from the unknown 
teacher to the Wehrmacht generals and high-ranking SA leaders on the ‘Night of 
the Long Knives’” (Mulisch 2005: 76-77). 
Not long thereafter, Mulisch describes a scene from a few weeks earlier. One 
day the author was called up by a couple who want to get to know him. Later 
he realizes that they must have been Nazis, who felt sympathetic towards his 
reports on the Eichmann trial. It is in this chapter that Mulisch realizes for the 
first time how dangerous his experiment is. This may be because he is walking 
around in the city where Eichmann committed his crimes. There is something 
very dangerous about Mulisch having to identify with Eichmann. The next quote 
may serve as an illustration in this respect. 
At the height of the Göbbels Ministry I come to a standstill. Just as I try to 
hover back, which is difficult due to the strong head wind, a light gray ball 
rolls through the gutter. I look up to see who threw it, and in the distance, 
near the Brandenburg Gate, I see Eichmann approaching. He is looking at 
me, and I look at the ball at my feet. I cannot make myself throw the ball 
back. I squat and wait. My friends have also fallen silent. When Eichmann 
picks up the ball and returns, without saying a word, I say, ‘I am sorry 
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I did not throw back the ball.’ For a moment he looks around, silently, and 
then he walks on.  (Mulisch 2005: 77) 15
Later on, Mulisch visits Eichmann’s former headquarters. At that point, he finds 
himself standing in the same place from where Eichmann dispatched his orders. 
In some kind of way, he has followed in Eichmann’s footsteps. In this passage, 
the lines between fiction and reality get blurred. Mulisch describes how difficult 
it is for him to enter the headquarters; he does not tell us how he has actually 
arrived there. We might as well conclude from that that he arrived there not 
in reality, but in fiction. “Grinding my teeth I go outside again, and I take up a 
position on the other side. Never before was I so sure I was going to get in! I am 
sweating, thinking up evil tricks… And here, at this instant, I will unfortunately 
have to enshroud my report in darkness. We will continue half an hour later: I am 
in the hall of the former Amt IV B4, Eichmann’s headquarters” (Mulisch 2005: 83). 
In both scenes (the one with the ball and the one at the headquarters), 
Mulisch comes in almost direct contact with Eichmann. The first scene 
however, is the description of a dream, whereas the second scene could very 
well be invented by the author. The literary writer here uses his freedom 
as a writer to make use of fiction to take his method of identification one 
step further than is possible in reality. In the last chapter, “A Museum in 
Oswiecim,” Mulisch uses the same literary technique. He describes his visit 
to Oswiecim, the former Auschwitz. As he travels there by train, he narrates 
a few moments in the history of the Holocaust. In this chapter, Mulisch plays 
two roles: at one time he is the travel writer, telling us about his experiences, 
at another he comes across as a more or less objective historian. And what 
he is going through parallels the fate of the deported Jews. Again Mulisch 
is following in the footsteps, this time of the Jews that were deported to 
Auschwitz. “The crematorium, with its tall, square chimney, stands in front 
of the entrance: the first thing to greet the prisoner. Inside, every brick of the 
ovens is adorned with names and dates; on one of the iron carriages used 
to shove the bodies into the fire lies a wreath of fresh flowers” (Mulisch 
2005: 166). The alternation of present and past tense shows how Mulisch 
wants to connect his own experiences in the present with the horrors that 
occurred at the place where he is now. Thus far, he had identified himself 
15 “Ter hoogte van het Goebbelsministerie kom ik tot stilstand. Juist als ik probeer terug te zweven, 
wat mij door een sterke tegenwind moeilijk valt, komt door de goot een lichtgrijze bal aangerold. Ik 
kijk wie hem gegooid heeft en zie in de verte, bij het Brandenburger Tor, Eichmann naderen. Hij kijkt 
naar mij, en ik kijk naar de bal voor mijn voeten; ik kan er niet toe komen, hem terug te gooien. Ik 
hurk neer en wacht. Ook mijn vrienden zijn stil geworden. Als Eichmann de bal oppakt en zonder 
een woord terugkeert, zeg ik: ‘Neem mij niet kwalijk, dat ik de bal niet gegooid heb.’ Hij kijkt even 
zwijgend om en loopt verder” (Mulisch 1962: 88).
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with the slaughterers (Eichmann and Hitler), now he takes the decisive step 
of identifying with their victims. I quote a passage to illustrate this: 
We pass a bridge across a railroad line; it is the bridge on which Himmler, 
on March 1, 1941, waved toward where the camp should be built – the 
camp of the Final Solution decided on in Wannsee. Shortly thereafter, Höss 
and Eichmann drove in the indicated direction to determine the definitive 
place. I see the place. A gigantic entrance building, with a watchtower 
above the gate, into which the rails disappear. Hundreds of yards to the 
left and to the right: barbwire. The mechanics race in. There is not a single 
soul to be seen. As far as the eye can see: wooden barracks, each separated 
from the next by more barbwire. To the left of the rails, which separate into 
three tracks, the barracks have been preserved (the women’s camp); to the 
right much was burned down, leaving stone chimneys in long lines. The 
cows of the SS had the same barracks, but were provided with a concrete 
floor and ventilation. The mechanics drive and drive; we will not come 
back to the same place. At the other end of the camp I see the entrance 
gate blurred in the mist. It’s the loneliest spot on Earth, describable only 
through silence.  (Mulisch 2005: 169) 16  
To a certain extent, this is what Mulisch does in the remaining pages of his book: 
being silent. He describes what he sees around him: the four crematoria. Then 
he gives a voice to some of the real witnesses, the actual victims (Gisa Landau, 
Krystyna Zywulska) alternating with some of the offenders (Höss, Johan 
Kremer). He reports some facts about the composition of Zyklon B and lets Höss 
speak again. The I-narrator no longer comments on anything; he more or less 
functions as a camera. We can interpret this closing passage of Criminal Case 
40/61 as a verbal representation of speechlessness. Rather than speaking, he lets 
others speak. At the end of the text, the author can only stammer facts: 
Zyklon B was supplied by the companies of Degesh and Testa, of the I.G. 
Farben Konzern. In the year 1943 they supplied 12,174,09 kilograms, on 
which the net profit was 127,985,79 reichsmark. The crematoriums were 
16 “Wij passeren een brug over een spoorlijn; het is de brug waarop Himmler op 1 maart 1941 een 
handbeweging maakte in de richting, waar het kamp moest komen – het kamp van de Endlösung, 
waartoe in Wannsee was besloten. Korte tijd later reden Höss en Eichmann in de aangegeven rich-
ting om de definitieve plaats vast te stellen. Ik zie de plaats. Een reusachtig toegangsgebouw met een 
wachttoren boven de poort, waarin alle rails verdwijnen. Honderden meters naar links en rechts: 
prikkeldraad. De monteurs razen naar binnen. Er is geen sterveling te zien. Zo ver het oog reikt: 
houten barakken, ook onderling weer door prikkeldraad afgescheiden. Links van de rails, die zich in 
drie sporen splitsen, zijn de barakken behouden (het vrouwenkamp), rechts is veel verbrand, stenen 
schoorstenen staan in lange rijen overeind. De koeien van de SS hadden dezelfde barakken, maar dan 
voorzien van een cementen bodem en luchtverversing. De monteurs rijden en rijden, wij komen niet 
op dezelfde plaats terug. Aan het andere eind van het kamp zie ik de toegangspoort vervaagd in de 
nevel. Het is de eenzaamste plek op aarde, alleen door zwijgen te beschrijven” (Mulisch 1962: 191).
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supplied by the company of J.A. Topf & Söhne in Wiesbaden. On January 
5, 1953, this company obtained patent no. 861731 for the ‘treatment and 
processing for the burning of corpses, cadavers, and parts thereof.’
And in the white mist the Sun of Birkenau is hanging. In the distance 
the locomotives are still steadily blowing their whistles.  (Mulisch 2005: 
171) 17  
At the end of the book, the intellectual reporter is dumbfounded. The only thing 
he can do now is enumerate facts and quotes. These facts and quotations placed 
together give us a horrifying picture of the incomprehensible evil of Auschwitz. 
In the last line, nothing is left for him but to watch (the sun) and listen (to the 
echoes of the locomotives). The narrator of Criminal Case 40/61 ends up in the 
death camp. This means that he has penetrated into the heart of evil, he identified 
with the victims (because he is there), but he wasn’t able to really identify with 
them (because he is there in 1961). The final answer to the question of Eichmann 
is this image he shows us. He takes the reader to the ultimate end point. The 
ending that was also the starting point of his research. The station where the 
trains arrive, the loneliest place on earth. The answer to the Eichmann enigma 
cannot be given in discursive language, the writer needs metaphors to give us an 
idea of the unimaginable. 
8. Conclusion 
In this report, the literary writer develops a highly personal and literary way 
to write about Eichmann. Above I outlined a number of techniques he used 
to achieve this goal. First, Mulisch makes use of an autofictional construction. 
Writing about Eichmann, Mulisch thinks about himself and creates himself as 
a writer again. The literary experiment he engages in changes his authorship 
and his self-image fundamentally. Second, Mulisch uses a (metaphorical) way 
of thinking and writing that transgresses the journalistic or historicist mimetic-
referential and discursive ways of writing. A problem as complex as the essence 
of evil can not be comprehended with the methods of journalism and history 
only, the Eichmann enigma calls for a new language.
17 “Zyklon B werd geleverd door de firma’s Degesch en Testa van het I.G. Farben Konzern. In het 
jaar 1943 leverden zij 12.174,09 kilo, waarop een zuivere winst werd gemaakt van 127.985,79 RM. De 
krematoria werden geleverd door de firma J. A. Topf & Söhne, Wiesbaden, die op 5 januari 1953 in de 
Bondsrepubliek het oktrooi no. 861731 verwierf voor een ‘Verfahren und Vorrichtung zur Verbrennung 
von Leichen, Kadavern un Teilen davon.’ En in de witte nevel hangt de zon van Birkenau. Ver weg fluiten 
nog onafgebroken de lokomotieven” (Mulisch 1962: 194).
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Central to Mulisch’s literary method are two principles: that of the invention 
of language and images (remember how Mulisch used E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Der 
Sandmann as a metaphor to come to understanding) and that of the radical 
identification. The former principle starts from the assumption that in order 
to understand reality, the literary writer has to approach reality as if it were a 
literary text. Like the Olimpia doll in the Hoffmann story, Eichmann becomes the 
main character in Mulisch’s text. Eichmann therefore was not only a creation of 
Hitler, he becomes a creation of Mulisch too. 
Here we encounter the second principle. Following Thomas Mann it is central 
to Mulisch’s writing to take up contact with the dark side of the myth. A literary 
writer will only understand Eichmann if he dares to put himself at risk. To 
do so, the writer has to let go of the conventions of objectivity and reliability 
and approach the war criminal in a literary way. In the chapters in Berlin and 
Oswiecim, Mulisch makes himself the metaphor with which he approaches 
the past. He is Eichmann (by standing in his headquarters), he is not Eichmann 
(because he is there in 1961). He is a victim (standing in Auschwitz) and he is not 
a victim (because he is there in 1961, in Oswiecim). The mystery of reality that 
Mulisch speaks of can only be approached when a writer uses all the freedoms 
literature allows him to use. This literary method is in essence related to the 
freedom to say and write whatever you think is right. It is free, but not obligatory: 
it requires the writer to be willing to put himself in the game and to put himself 
at risk. 
Bibliography
Abrams, M. H.  1953.  The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bax, Sander.  2007.  De taak van de schrijver: Een poëticaal debat in de Nederlandse literatuur, 
1968-1985 [The writer’s task: A debate on poetics in Dutch literature, 1968-1985].  
Den Bosch: Next Editions. 
Broek, Ilma van den.  2003.  “De persoonlijke politiek van New Journalism” [The 
personal politics of New Journalism].  Tijdschrift voor Mediageschiedenis 6.1.  108-121.
Buurlage, Jos.  1999.  Onveranderlijk veranderlijk: Harry Mulisch tussen literatuur, 
journalistiek, wetenschap en politiek in de jaren zestig en zeventig [Unchangeable 
changeable: Harry Mulisch between literature, journalism, science and politics  
in the sixties and seventies].  Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.
Ceelen, Han, en Jeroen van Bergeijk.  2007.  Meer dan de feiten: Gesprekken met auteurs van 
literaire non-fictie [More than the facts: Interviews with writers of literary non-fiction].  
Amsterdam: Atlas.
Drion, Huib.  1966.  “Tussen massamens en kunstenaar: Mulisch over Eichmann” 
[Between mass man and artist: Mulisch on Eichmann].  Tirade 10.118.  628-633.
7(1) 2012  werkwinkel 
Sander Bax60
Heynders, Odile.  2010.  “Wiens verhaal is het? Willem Frederik Hermans en Hella S. 
Haasse.”  Alleen blindgeborenen verwijten de schrijver dat hij liegt: Over het schrijverchap 
van Willem Frederik Hermans.  Eds Frans Ruiter en Wilbert Smulders.  Amsterdam: De 
Bezige Bij.  165-182.
_____.  2009.  Voices of Europe: Literary Writers as Public Intellectuals.  Tilburg: n.p. 
Johnson, Michael L.  1971.  The New Journalism: The Underground Press, the Artists of 
Nonfiction and Changes in the Established Media.  Kansas: University Press of Kansas.  
Kracauer, Siegfried.  1947.  From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German 
Film.  New York: Princeton University Press.
Manen, Rosanne van.  2010.  De tekst als experiment: De zaak 40/61 en New Journalism. 
MA.  Tilburg University.
Melzer, A. M.  2003.  “What is an Intellectual?”  The Public Intellectual: Between Philosophy 
and Politics.  Eds A. M. Melzer, J. Weinberger, and M. R. Zinman.  Harvard: Rowman 
& Littlefield.
Mourits, Bertram.  2008.  “Waar gebeurd is wel degelijk een excuus: De grenzen van de 
literaire non-fictie” [True story is certainly an excuse: The limits of literary non-fiction].  
 De Revisor 38.2/3.  7-17.
Mulisch, Harry.  2005.  Criminal Case 40/61. The Trial of Adolf Eichmann: An Eyewitness 
Account.  Trans. Robert Naborn.  Foreword by Deborah Dwork. Pennsylvenia: 
Pennsylvenia University Press.
_____.  1980.  De compositie van de wereld [The composition of the world].  Amsterdam: De 
Bezige Bij.
_____.  1978.  “Een geldig recept?” [A valid recipe?].  Paniek der onschuld [Panic of 
innocence].  Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.  35-45.
_____.  1967.  “Het ‘neen.’” [ The ‘no’].  Wenken voor de jongste dag [Hints for the last day].  
Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.  239-248.
_____.  1966.  Bericht aan de rattenkoning [Message to the rat king].  Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij. 
_____.  1962 [1961]  De zaak 40/61 [Criminal Case 40/61].  Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.
_____.  1962 [1959].  The Stone Bridal Bed [Het stenen bruidsbed].  Trans. Adrienne Dixon.  
London: Abelard Schumann.
_____.  1960. Voer voor psychologen [Food for Psychologists].  Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.
Rubinstein, Renate.  1962.  “Mulisch als rapporteur en filosoof: Eichmann ten onrechte 
als robot geschilderd” [Mulisch as reporter and philosopher: Eichmann incorrectly 
portrayed as a robot].  Vrij Nederland 31 maart 1962.
Ruiter, Frans, en Wilbert Smulders.  2010.  “Van moedwil tot misverstand, van 
Dorleijn tot Vaessens: Kritische kanttekeningen uit het veld” [From wantonness to 
misunderstanding, from Dorleijn to Vaessens: Critical comments out of the scientific 
field].  Tijdschrift voor Nederlandse Taal- en Letterkunde 126.1.  63-85.
Tijn, Joop van.  2007.  “Ik dacht dat het leven veel exacter in elkaar zat, maar het blijkt 
één grote improvisatie: Drie van vijftig over vijftig zijn” [I thought life was composed 
in a much more exact fashion, but it turns out to be one big improvisation: Three men 
aged 50 about being 50].  Onsterfelijk leven: Interviews met Harry Mulisch.  Red. Onno 
Blom.  Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.  158-179.  
Wolfe, Tom.  1973.  The New Journalism.  New York: Harper & Row. 
Zuiderent, Ad.  2008.  “Fictie ontmoet non-fictie: Frictie? Over een voorstel van Frank 
 Westerman” [Fiction meets non-fiction. Friction? On a proposal by Frank 
Westerman]. Neerlandistische ontmoetingen: Trefpunt Wrocław.  Reds Irena Barbara 
Kalla en Bożena Czarnecka.  Wrocław: Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT.  250-266. 
